XXIX International Scientific Conference

Strategic Management

and Decision Support Systems
in Strategic Management

SM2024

Subotica (Serbia), 17-18 May, 2024

Dr. Róbert Dobó PhD
Budapest Business University,
Budapest, Hungary
dobo.robert@uni-bge.hu

MILITARY CONFLICTS AND COUNTRY IMAGE: THE COUNTRY IMAGE OF BELLIGERENTS IN LIGHT OF UKRAINE, A DEMOGRAPHIC, COMMUNICATION CHANNEL AND POLITICAL PREFERENCE BASED PERSPECTIVE.

Abstract: Country image is an important aspect in international relations (tourism, products and services, trade etc.) thus a lot of emphasis is put on it from a marketing communication perspective, in order to influence the individuals in their view. According to the aims of the sender, the messages can have a positive or negative effect on how we perceive certain regions or entire countries and their leaders or specific policies. Nye (2004) describes this projection as "soft power" when exporting ideas towards a desired outcome, Herman & Chomsky (2008) stresses that premise of discourse is influenced by topic setting, thus interpretation of events can be changed, which are in line with the work and theories of Bernays, who among other stressed that expected form of behaviour should be impacted, with the assistance of psychological techniques and propaganda (public mass persuasions). Thus conditioning the public for certain narratives in accordance to individual or political objectives can be considered as vide spread. This involves fake news and creative new ways of distributing desired narratives through online and social media marketing, given its proliferation, accessibility and low entry barriers (from a communication perspective) makes it an ideal platform for information (message) dissemination. Presently in 2024 there are more localised and international conflicts, where belligerents aim to persuade the public (voters) of their own and of other countries in their favour, thus of their moral superiority over their adversaries. This can in turn create political support for certain desired policies. In the article, according to my modest means, I will explore these techniques and theories, and show through the conflict in Ukraine, how different groups in Hungary (according to demographic markers, marketing communication channel trust, and political party preference) have varying opinions of those countries that are in the focus, namely Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the European Union. During my research a primary questionnaire study has been performed and preliminary data analysis suggests a strong correlation of communication channel trust and political party preference which in turn polarises public opinion about these states, all in a trend like fashion. Thus, where the individual gathers information and news; and what kind of political affiliation the same person has, will have an effect on the country image, meaning that different narratives can be identified and their effects shown in practice.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine, marketing communication, communication channel, political marketing

1. INTRODUCTION

Media and communication has been in the centre of attention, especially with the creative and new ways that mass media is able to target the individual. This is done not only by targeting larger audiences, but the individual through careful STP (Segmentation, Targeting and Positioning) techniques. We presume that these are new techniques, but targeting the individual for an expected form of behaviour is a classical thought. The ancient romans were one of the first to involve vide spread propaganda in their communication, as some scholars consider and bring up the example of the "SPQR" symbol being used as only a mere marketing communication technique. The inscription SPQR "Senatus Populusque Romanus" on the flag and shields of the legionaries was itself only a marketing ploy on the part of the

reigning emperor, since at that time (after 31 BC) neither the senate nor the people significantly influenced political decisions (Baines and O' Shaughnessy, 2014). Using communication to influence doesn't only mean to encourage for a specific behaviour. Propaganda is a term of Latin origin - "propagare" - meaning: to spread an idea, popularize a view, a theory. A term related to political marketing, which is a collection of doctrines and principles – or views – that an organization or movement disseminates (communicates – publishes) in order to promote some desired behaviour (Casey, 1944). By communicating a desired outcome, also involves deterring from certain actions that the public might take. The individual in society, the actions and thinking can be changed considerably when external factors, such as a crowd is involved. The individual will act against normal instincts, and this can be used if the psychology of the crowd is analysed (Le Bon, 1896). These techniques are still adopted today, as we are faced with organisations of multicultural character (Bendersky, 2007).

Today, not only groups are targeted, but there is a practice of influencing on social media which is called "micro-targeting". Given the IT systemisation of consumers, information is gathered through online activities (smartphone, smart TV, or the platform provider) will store consumption patterns in the form of accessible data. This in turn can be converted from social interactions into real-time data that can be measured online, and not only describe social behaviour and its context, but can also be used to predict it. Thus IT analysis and evaluation enables micro-target groups to be defined and to be targeted individually (Andok, 2022. Chapter 6.).

This does not mean that classical or traditional offline media would be less important when distributing information. Having a one way interaction with the audiences, the sender has much more control over the message. Research has indicated that online advertisement may cause "vegging" effect on the user, meaning that they will be more passive towards ads and simply disregard them (Bezjian-Averiy, Calder and Iacobucci, 1998). Thus online messages may not be more effective that offline ones. Further complicating the issue is the data that indicates that increased interactivity may defer the user (the target) from the message itself, and makes the person engage in other things, thus interrupts the process of persuasion. As for the purposes of this study, this might not be a problem, as interactions form groups is an important aspect when gathering information and news. Users may identify similarly minded groups or individual when two-way communication is present, they are able to bond with one another and form new groups. These groups can be called "bubbles". Social media interactions have shown remarkable possibilities, empowering individuals to form groups, thus gather and act together towards a collective, group interest (Harlow, 2013). Although other studies indicate that this "empowerment" effect might be limited.

We presume that all individuals are presented with all information that is available, thus they disseminate credible and fake-news, and we also presume that they gather information from a wide spread. Research indicates that this, may it be classical offline or new online media channels is not the case. The user has a "diet" of communication channels, meaning some that they frequent, and some that they disregard because of subjective personal reasons, thus the individual has preferences. When looking at social media (Eady et. al, 2019) data shows that clear trends are visible in both sides of the political spectrum, liberal and conservative. By looking at quintile data, in the two most liberal groups, 84-85% of respondents are in a media bubble, gathering information (following) more liberal channels, while the same trend only a bit weaker is present on the conservative side, 78% of people in the most conservative quintile exhibit similar patters towards conservative media outlets and channels. In Hungary, similar patterns are visible according to the pro-government and pro-opposition line, voters preferring different mediums and communication channels (Hann et. al. 2020). This indicates that no matter if the message is seen on- or off-line, if it is not within the specific bubble that the user is a member of, the consumer will not take it as credible source and will probably disregard it.

It should be stressed that people live in "bubbles" that are formed and influenced by their political views. They gather information accordingly from different news sources and channels, thus they may be contrasted with different narratives. These same in turn can mean that two individuals may have contrasting views by the same events or in this case countries.

The aim of the study is to analyse the effects of narrative, and to show its functioning in practice with the help of a primary questionnaire study. Will political affiliation and information gathering preferences (channel based trust) change the image of the European Union, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America?

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A primary study was conducted in the turn of 2023-2024 (December and January), that gathered the answers of 294 respondents, which were later digitally analysed on one hand using Microsoft Excel 2013, and also using IBM SPSS version 24. Descriptive statistical, Pearson's correlation analysis (using the ward method) on the available data was performed. During the data gathering, a snowball method was used through social media platforms, thus the data is not representative, but indicative. From the 294 respondents, some of the answers contained a high level of missing values that needed to be excluded, thus the analysis was performed on the remaining 280. It should be noted, that because of the nature of the research, I did not have the opportunity to collect longitudinal data, thus a snapshot is presented of the sample with a cross-sectional analysis of the obtained results.

During the in-depth analysis (IBM, 2021; Sajtos-Mitev, 2007), respondents marked on a 6 level Likert scale their level of trust towards communication channels, countries and political parties. The Pearson Correlation analysis measures the movement of two variables and indicates the direction, strength and significance of the linkage. It measure between +1

meaning total linearity and co-movement, and -1 meaning a complete inverted relationship. The closer values are to 1, the stronger the relationship. The program indicates significance, one star (*) on a 0,05, while two stars (**) on a 0,01 level. Positive correlation means that if the respondent gave a high number or value at one question, than the same higher level is visible at another one. No correlation means that the two data rows have no connection with each other, while a negative correlation shows an inverse relationship, if the participant gave a high value in one case, there is a low value at another question.

3. AGENDA SETTING AND NARRATIVE

Although more cognitive biases can be identified, to understand the agenda setting theory, the framing effect (bias) should be considered. People tend to base their decisions more on how an issue is presented or "framed" than on the information that is put forward and communicated. Selecting the alternative that is more positively presented, or framed, is a cognitive default (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

When comparing various media impact models and how recipients process news items that set agendas and frameworks is a complex issue. The level of focus on news messages necessary for the impacts to happen can be one point of comparison. We may presume that when viewers give news messages a lot of attention, a framing effect takes place. That is, an audience member who pays attention to a news article is likely to be most aware of the substance and consequences of an issue frame. One may apply a similar reasoning to the process of creating the agenda. It would seem that agenda-setting and framing work via comparable phenomenological mechanisms. On the other hand, the fundamental framing strategy postulates that the issue's description or the term applied to it in news reports have an effect. The main impact of a frame is the underlying interpretive schemas that have been applied to the problem. Thus, the key psychological distinction between priming and agenda setting on the one hand, and framing on the other, is the distinction between whether and how we think about a problem (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). In simpler terms framing is picturing an issue in a positive or negative light, while agenda setting is the effect that media has on the public when transferring the news, while influencing in a deliberate way, how the public perceives the information. As shown in the work of Heideker and Steul-Fischer (2017) they find a strong correlation between credibility and the effect of source-based trust when examining the credibility of advertisements.

When examined how the media and public agendas are determined by the network, some research findings show strong correlations. According to this theoretical paradigm, news media outlets have the ability to simultaneously highlight various groups of objects or traits in the public consciousness (Guo, Vu and McCombs, 2012), thus link information from possibly unrelated events into one comprehensive agenda. This agenda setting nature of mass media has been demonstrated by McCombs and Shaw (1972) who indicate that mass media is able to make voters respond to the same events in different ways. Thus they have "alternative" approaches to news and daily happenings in the political sphere.

Nye (2004) describe different models of power, and one of them is "soft power" that is derived from cultural influence, rather than direct military confrontation when projecting power from one to another country. Thus in the line with the conflict in Ukraine, and country image, these soft power techniques should be analysed, one being the agenda and the narrative that people are confronted with, thus which in turn shapes the same public opinion. Thus mass media and communication channel usage is a soft power technique.

The fact that social media is currently the largest mass medium in Hungary, surpassing television (meaning the number of social media registrations – 7,4 million – is higher that the number of television subscriptions – 3,4 million subscriptions), means different approaches should be taken considering these mediums (Statista, 2024, KSH, 2024). At the same time, the ownership structure and profit goals of mass media should be considered when projecting news with an agenda. Previously, in the 60-70s there was public debate about the dangers of centralisation of media and news, in addition to foreign influence, especially in case of political coverage (Herman and Chomsky, 2008). Given the interconnected nature of media and the government interests, communication channels are the first filters when searching for news.

This interconnected nature and the specific functioning of social media has shown its drawbacks on multiple occasions. When looking at the elections of 2016 in the Unites States of America, research shows that an alarming rate of fake news were present through these mediums (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2016). This is partially happening because the costs affiliated with using this channel are negligible, especially for larger organisations (parties and affiliates). Thus in a conflict, the opponents may use these

4. FRAMING COUNTRY IMAGE

Bernays (1942) describes the aim of belligerents as functioning in two ways. First, to secure the support of the domestic population, and second to demoralize the public of the "enemy". This also means that any unfavourable news should be communicated as lies from adversaries. From the list of models, for this research "propaganda of hope" should be further elaborated on, as one that aims in securing foreign support. This should be contrasted with the notion that propaganda should be used in a constructive way, to inform the population, to assist social change and evolution, namely to be involved in "peace propaganda" (Bernays, 1936). Thus the country image, the view that the public has

about the adversaries can be influenced by propaganda and targeted (framed) narrative, according to the aims of the sender.

Political communication is part of the political system, which is connected on the one hand to the communication system (channel politics, advertising) and on the other hand to the citizens/voters themselves. In this complex space, not only the exchange of messages takes place, but also the confrontation between different actors (Mazzoleni, 2002). In this interpretation, a three-player model emerges during communication, not two, since the media and all of its actors are parts of this system while creating and framing the narrative that they present to their receiving audiences. Therefore, the same phenomenon or event can have different meanings according to the goals of not only the political actor, but the media as well.

During image building, an actor is creating value for the organization and providing a complex experience that is created through experience (Papp-Váry, 2020). How can states or governments or political parties influence their image? If we want to go around the political image and branding, we will find several interpretations of the brand concept. Modern politics is the battle of competing images (Scammell, 2015). The image can be understood as a kind of manipulation that enables easier influence by creating a virtual image, as opposed to, for example, meaningful communication that requires higher cognitive abilities.

Another important issue when building the image is that in today's modern age, permanent campaigns are becoming more and more typical, even outside the traditional campaign period. This involves interaction between political organisations and the public (domestic and foreign). The interaction also helps the organization to collect data, analyse it, and then send even more effective messages, thus increasing the "customer", in this case public value (Kandikó, 2005), which in this form means the subjective satisfaction of the voter. Thanks to digitization, today's modern brands are no longer developed only through the traditional communication of organizations, but also during interactions in the online space, especially on social media platforms, as users have become integral parts and co-creators of the branding process (Dennhardt, 2012).). This also confirms the importance of the previously discussed interactions between political actors and (potential) sympathizers (domestic and "enemy" public).

In this sense, two competing theories are present. One states that the individual is tied to the given party on a psychological and emotional basis (ideologically motivated), so they have a party identity (Downer, 2016). This can also be interpreted as psychological identification. Thus when contrasted with a country image, this identity will define the narrative and view. While the other, according to the interpretation of Ries and Trout (2001, Chapter I), the position is already in the mind of the public, so the basic approach to positioning (image) should not be to create something new, but to manipulate/modify the existing one. Thus when influencing the country image, should we target identity and individual motivations, or should the sender try to adapt and modify an existing image? The current scope of the article follows the logic of the first one, thus it is considered that affiliation and identity will have an effect on the country image.

As online platforms, as previously discussed especially social media have low entry barriers, beside traditional offline channels, country image can be affected by targeted ads and framed narratives by both parties in a conflict. Evidence suggests, that this spread of information (and dis-information, fake news, propaganda) is online is a growing international security concern (Bradshaw, 2020). These actions are visible in foreign information interference, spreading fake news and manipulating narrative (Rogers and Niederer, 2020).

6. PRIMARY STUDY ANALYSIS

During the research eight communication channels and eight political parties were analysed beside the main demographic factors (age, gender, city population, income level) on country image.

Considering the communication channels, Friends and Family were valued as the most reliable ones, followed by online channels and social media. Generally in all other cases except for Family and Friends channels trust is unfavourable and low, thus respondents consider them unreliable (the median is 3,5 in the 1-6 Likert scale), public service television and radio being the lowest. Standard deviation is showing a trend, the lower the average trust level, the lower the std. dev. thus respondents agree on more on those which they view unfavourably (See Picture 1.).

Picture 1: Communication Channel Trust
Source: Own editing according the primary study

When performing a Pearson correlation analysis, the data shows a trend like picture. Those who trust information from Family and Friends view the Russian Federation in more positive light. Public service television and radio trust has a positive effect on the Russian Federation, while it has a negative effect on the image of the European Union and Ukraine. Online sources have opposing trends, those favouring these channels have a better opinion about the European Union, the United States of America and Ukraine. (See Table 1.)

Table 1: Pearson Correlation values of the researched countries and the communication channels

Pearson Correlation	EU	USA	RUS	UKR
Family and Friends	-0,069	0,079	,266**	0,140
Commercial TV	0,031	0,139	0,131	0,057
Public Service TV	-,224	0,016	,433**	-,181
Commercial Radio	-0,003	0,142	,147*	0,030
Public Service Radio	-,258	-0,043	,402**	-,259
Online sources	,240**	,179*	-0,015	,174*
Social Media	0,040	0,124	,163*	,147*
Print Media	-0,092	0,020	0,134	0,020

Source: Own editing According to the primary study

In this case further analysis was performed to introduce a new correlation, if the political party preference and the communication channel trust has a relationship. Given the secondary data of Hann (et. al. (2020) pro-government respondents should trust public service channels and commercial television channels more, while opposition favouring ones online and social media.

The data shows that there is a correlation between which party someone prefers and where do they think credible information comes from.

The eight political parties analysed were: Fidesz (FID), currently iin a coalition government serving their fourth term. Democratic Coalition (DK), Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP), Momentum (MOM), Jobbik – Conservatives (JOBB), Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP), Hungary's Green Party (LMP), Our Homeland Movement (MIH). The analysis shows that those ideologically (IDE) agreeing with a party, also have more positive views when looking at communication channel trust. The ruling party and the conservatives trust information that come from Family and Friends, Public Service news sources and classical offline channels, while those sympathising with opposition parties trust online channels and social media. In two cases we see negative correlation, which mean that consentients of the Momentum and the Two-Tailed Dog Party generally distrust public service channels, associated with governmental news. Thus there is a clear preferential difference between governmental and opposition voters when it comes to communication channel trust, meaning that opposing political spectrums use different sources of information. (See Table 2.)

Table 2: Pearson Correlation values of the researched parties and the communication channels

	Fam.&Fri.	Com.TV	Pub.S.TV	Com.Radio	Pub.S.Radio	Online	Soc.Med.	Print Media
IDEFID	,184*	,196**	,408**	,172*	,411**	-0,035	0,049	,170*
IDEDK	-0,018	,163*	-0,040	0,110	-0,048	,225**	0,103	0,062
IDEMSZP	0,058	,249**	0,067	,169*	-0,013	0,129	,211**	0,058
IDEMOM	-0,030	,156*	-,161	0,094	-,190	,169	0,117	0,095
IDEJOBB	-0,042	0,097	0,136	0,068	0,088	0,055	0,107	,152*
IDEMKKP	-0,104	-0,100	-,174	-0,043	-,195	0,083	0,126	0,038
IDELMP	-0,018	,150*	-0,113	0,068	-,154*	,197**	0,089	0,082
IDEMIH	0,090	,172*	,377**	,207**	,369**	0,031	0,139	,172*

Because of the strong correlation of communication channels and political parties, when considering the political affiliation of the person and the researched counties, we see similar patterns. Those more agreeing ideologically with governmental and conservative parties value the European Union and Ukraine lower, while opposition voters have a more positive opinion about them. (See Table 3.) The data are showing a trend, we see opposing view in the case of governmental and opposition voters.

Table 3: Pearson Correlation values of the researched parties and the countries

	IDEFID	IDEDK	IDEMSZP	IDEMOM	IDEJOBB	IDEMKKP	IDELMP	IDEMIH
EU	,348	,251**	,197**	,349**	0,014	,176*	,196**	,215
USA	-0,124	,145*	,195**	,171*	0,031	0,004	-0,007	-0,052
RUS	,440**	-0,001	0,057	-0,077	,218**	-,184	0,001	,459**
UKR	,210	0,122	0,141	,295**	0,030	0,130	,219**	-0,104

When considering demographic data on country image, only age has a weak effect on the countries. Older participants have a more favourable view of the European Union and age effects negatively the Russian Federation. This might be happening because of historical reasons. The image of Ukraine and the Unites States has no connection to any of the demographic indicators.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Countries use a variety of practices to influence public opinion, including propaganda, framing and narrative (Agenda setting). This is especially important when military confrontations are happening, when domestic and foreign audiences need to be persuaded.

During the primary study, the data indicates that communication channel trust has a strong correlation with political party preference, according to ideological views. This means that which party a person favours will have an effect on where information and news will be gathered from, which channels will be considered as credible news sources. The more pro-governmental and conservative political preferences the person has, the higher trust is visible at public service and classical offline channels, while in the case of opposition voters, online and social media channels are preferred and considered as credible. Thus according to political and ideological affiliation, on these channels different narratives can be presented to the public that can affect the country image itself.

From the data it can be deducted that public opinion is polarised about the researched states, all in a trend like fashion along the pro-government/conservative and opposition/liberal political line. The first group will have a more positive opinion about the Russian Federation and a more negative one about the European Union, while the second group will show opposite patterns, have a more favourable opinion about the EU and Ukraine. The image of the USA is the least influenced by communication channel trust and political affiliation, but in a similar trend. When considering demographic markers, no significant correlation and no trends can be found, except for a weak impact of age.

Because of the patterns, it is presumed that from a governmental and conservative political platform, and the channels that these organisation use (classical-offline), the voters are presented with narratives that have an elevating effect on the image of the Russian Federation, and a decreasing one on the European Union and Ukraine. Opposite patterns are

visible when considering opposition and liberal political spectrums, and online communication channels. This has an elevating effect on the EU and Ukraine, and a decreasing one on Russia.

The analysis shows patterns and correlations, but it doesn't provide us with a clear cause and effect explanation. It is not clear weather communication channel trust has an effect on party preference, thus different media channels drive their target audiences towards certain political organisations that have the same ideological views and narratives as the channel provider. Or if parties have connections and relationships with some of the communication channels, thus the media mimics the narratives that these organisations promote, they provide more place for these selected views to be shown. At the moment it is the presumption that the second one is more likely, but further research will be needed to gain a deeper understanding of the question.

REFERENCES

Allcott, H. and Gentzkow, M. (2016) Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* , Spring 2017, Vol. 31, No. 2. pp. 211-235

Andok, M. (2022) *Digitális vallás. Az új információs technológiák hatása a vallásokra, vallási közösségekre Magyarországon,* (Digital religion. The impact of new information technologies on religions and eligious communities in Hungary): Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, Hungary

Baines, P. R. and O'Shaughnessy N. J. (2014) Political Marketing and Propaganda: Uses, Abuses, Misuses, *Journal of Political Marketing*, Nol. 13. Issue 1-2, pp. 1–18.

Bendersky, J. W. (2007) "Panic": The impact of le Bon's crowd psychology on u.s. military thought, *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 43(3), pp. 257–283.

Bernays, E. L. (1942) The Marketing of National Policies: A Study of War Propaganda, *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 6, No. 3. pp. 236-244.

Bernays, E. L. (1936) Freedom of Propaganda, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, July 16, 1936, pp. 744-746

Bezjian-Avery, A; Calder, B; and Iacobucci, D. (1998) New Media Interactive Advertising vs.Traditional Advertising, *Journal of Advertisement Research*, Vol 38 (4). pp. 23–32.

Bradshaw, S. (2020) Influence Operations and Disinformation on Social Media, Centre for International Governance Innovation, *Modern Conflict and Artificial Intelligence*, Jan. 1, 2020, pp. 41-47

Casey, R. D. (1944) What is Propaganda? (online) Available from: "American Historical Association": http://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/what-is-propaganda (Accessed 18th February 2024)

Dennhardt, S. (2012) User-Generated Content and its Impact on Branding, Springer Gabler, Germany

Downer, L. (2016) Political Branding Strategies: Campaigning and Governing in Australian Politics, Palgrave MacMillan, Australia

Eady, G., Nagler, J., Guess, A., Zilinsky, J., & Tucker, J. A. (2019) How Many People Live in Political Bubbles on Social Media? Evidence From Linked Survey and Twitter Data. *SAGE Open, SMaPP Global Special Issue* 9(1).

Guo, L.; Vu, H. T. and McCombs, M. (2012) An Expanded Perspective on Agenda-Setting Effects. Exploring the third level of agenda setting, *Revista de Comunicación*, Vol. 11. pp. 51-66

Hann, E.; Megyeri, K.; Polyák, G. and Urbán, Á. (2020) Megfertőzött médiarendszer, A politikai tájékozódás forrásai Magyarországon (Infected media system, sources of political information in Hungary), (online) Available from: https://mertek.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Megfertozott_mediarendszer.pdf (Accessed: 2023.09.25)

Harlow, S. (2013) It was a "Facebook revolution": Exploring the meme-like spread of narratives during the Egyptian protests, Revista de Comunicación 12. pp. 59-82

Heideker, S and Steul-Fischer, M. (2017) The Effects of Message Framing and Ad Credibility on Health Risk Perception, *Journal of Research and Management*, Vol. 39. Jahrg., H. 2, pp. 49-64

Herman, E. S. and Chomsky, N. (2008) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, The Bodley Head, London, UK

IBM (2021) SPSS Statistics - KMO and Bartlett's test, (online) Available from: https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/spss-statistics/version-missing?topic=detection-kmo-bartletts-test (Accessed: 2023.08.21)

Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979) Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, *Econometrica*, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 263-292

Kandikó, J. (2005) Kapcsolati marketing, avagy a marketing sikere a vevőkapcsolatokban gyökerezik (Relationship marketing, or the success of marketing, is rooted in customer relationships), *Marketing Reklám*, 2005 March, pp. 55-63

KSH (2024) Hungarian Statistical Office, Television subscription, (online) Available from: https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/ikt/hu/ikt0037.html (Accessed: 2024.02.13)

Le Bon, G. (1896) The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, The Macmillan Co. New York, USA

Mazzoleni, G. (2002) Political Communication, Osiris, Budapest, Hungary

McCombs, M. E. and Shaw, D. L. (1972) The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, *The Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 176-187.

Nye, J. S. (2004) Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, Issue2, pp. 255-270.

Papp-Váry, Á. (2020) A márkanév ereje, a sikeres brandépítés alapjai (The power of the brand name, the foundations of successful brand building), Dialóg Campus, Budapest, Hungary

Ries, A. and Trout, J. (2001) Positioning: The Battle for Your Mind, McGraw-Hill, USA

Rogers, R. and Niederer, S. (2020) The Politics of Social Media Manipulation, Chapter One, pp. 19-57

Sajtos, L. and Mitev, A. (2007) SPSS Research and Data Analysis Handbook, Alinea, Budapest, Hungary

Scammell, M. (2015) Politics and Image: the conceptual value of branding, *Journal of Marketing*, Vol 14. Issue 1-2, pp. 7-18

Scheufele, D. A. and Tewksbury, D. (2007) Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models, *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 57, pp. 9–20.

Statista (2024) (online), Available from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/568952/predicted-number-of-social-network-users-in-hungary/ (Accessed: 2024.02.13)