DOI: 10.46541/978-86-7233-439-5_514

Sandra Nešić, Associate Professor
Faculty of Media and Communications, Singidunum University
Belgrade, Serbia
sandra.nesic@fmk.edu.rs
Participation (direct/virtual): direct
JEL: O32, M10

INNOVATION AS A STRATEGIC INTERFACE IN A BANI ENVIRONMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING

Abstract: Organizations operating in BANI environments (Brittle, Anxious, Non-linear, Incomprehensible) face a fundamental mismatch between established innovation management practice and the conditions under which strategic decisions are actually made. The traditional model, in which innovation teams reduce uncertainty before handing validated outputs into stable organizational systems, breaks down when the receiving system is itself in continuous flux. This paper examines how this breakdown repositions corporate innovation teams in relation to strategic decision-making and what implications that repositioning carries for how organizations maintain strategic coherence under persistent uncertainty.

The paper employs a practice-informed conceptual methodology grounded in systematic engagement with a six-year corpus of documented practitioner discourse, The Innovator's Handbook series (2021–2025), and its 2026 successor, Growth Guide: Innovation Impact in 2026. Drawing on sensemaking theory (Brown, Colville & Pye, 2015) and Teece's (2007) dynamic capabilities framework, the analysis identifies a mechanism shift from sequential handover to continuous interface.

The central conceptual contribution is the notion of the sensemaking interface as an organizational unit whose primary function is not to resolve uncertainty but to continuously translate emerging signals into informed options on which strategic decisions can be built. The paper further argues that AI and digital tools, while expanding the range of options available to innovation teams, amplify interpretive complexity rather than resolve it, making the sensemaking function more rather than less critical.

Three implications for strategic decision-making are developed: a shift from validation to interpretation, from planning to alignment, and from measuring output to measuring coherence. Together, these suggest that strategic effectiveness in BANI environments depends less on prediction and more on the quality of the interpretive loop connecting experimentation, organizational learning, and strategic intent.

The primary theoretical contribution of this paper is the concept of the sensemaking interface, which reframes innovation team function from solution delivery to continuous strategic interpretation, and proposes three corresponding shifts in how organizations approach decision-making under persistent uncertainty.

Keywords: BANI environment, corporate innovation teams, sensemaking, strategic decision-making, dynamic capabilities

1. INTRODUCTION

Consider a corporate innovation team that has spent six months developing and testing a new service concept. The concept has been validated with customers, the business case is sound, and the team is ready to hand it over to the business unit

responsible for scaling. By the time the handover meeting occurs, the strategic priorities of that business unit have shifted in response to a market disruption that emerged three months into the project. The validated concept no longer fits the context it was designed for. The team returns to exploration. The cycle repeats.

This scenario is not exceptional. It has become, for many organizations, the default experience of corporate innovation. The mechanism that was designed to connect innovation activity to strategic action - explore, validate, hand over - assumes that the organizational context receiving innovation outputs remains stable long enough to absorb them. In environments characterized by the BANI framework (Brittle, Anxious, Non-linear, Incomprehensible) (Cascio, 2020), that assumption no longer holds. Global instability does not merely accelerate the pace of change; it makes the receiving system itself a moving target. Innovation teams produce outputs for a context that has already changed by the time those outputs are ready.

This paper examines the implications of this mismatch for the role of corporate innovation teams in strategic decision-making. The central research question is: how does the role of corporate innovation teams in strategic decision-making change under conditions of persistent environmental uncertainty, and what implications does this shift have for how organizations maintain strategic coherence? The paper argues that BANI conditions reposition innovation teams from solution generators operating upstream of strategy to sensemaking interfaces, organizational units whose primary function is to translate emerging signals into informed options that strategic decisions can be built around, rather than to deliver validated answers into a stable system.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 establishes the theoretical background, drawing on the BANI and VUCA frameworks, the Stage-Gate model of innovation process, sensemaking theory, and dynamic capabilities. Section 3 describes the methodology, grounding the analysis in a six-year corpus of practitioner discourse. Section 4 develops the central argument, introducing the sensemaking interface concept and contrasting it with the traditional handover model. Section 5 examines the role of digital tools and AI as amplifiers of complexity rather than decision-support systems in the conventional sense. Section 6 derives implications for strategic decision-making at the levels of cognitive orientation, organizational process design, and performance assessment. Section 7 concludes with a summary of the paper's contribution, its limitations, and directions for future research.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Contemporary organizations increasingly operate in environments that resist the assumptions of stability and predictability on which traditional management frameworks were built. The concept of VUCA (Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous), first developed in military strategy and subsequently adopted in management discourse (Bennett & Lemoine, 2014), captured an early articulation of this shift. More recently, Cascio (2020) proposed the BANI framework to characterize environments in which disruptions are not merely frequent but systemic and interdependent. Where VUCA describes conditions of elevated uncertainty, BANI describes conditions in which the systems themselves behave in ways that defy linear analysis and prediction. For organizations, this distinction matters: a VUCA environment calls for better planning and greater agility; a BANI environment calls into question whether planning, as traditionally understood, remains a productive response at all.

The dominant process model through which organizations have historically managed innovation reflects this assumption of environmental stability. The Stage-Gate framework, developed by Cooper (2008), structures innovation as a sequential progression through defined phases - discovery, scoping, business case development, development, testing, and launch - with formal decision gates between each stage. Implicit in this architecture is the assumption that the organizational and market context into which innovation outputs will be delivered remains sufficiently stable to be anticipated. Innovation teams explore and validate; strategy and operations receive and implement. The handover is meaningful precisely because what is handed over enters a system whose parameters are known. In a BANI environment, this assumption fails. The receiving system is itself in motion, subject to the same conditions of brittleness, non-linearity, and incomprehensibility that the innovation was designed to address.

The theoretical framework best suited to understanding how organizations can function under these conditions is sensemaking. As Brown, Colville, and Pye (2015, p. 266) summarize, drawing on the foundational work of Weick, sensemaking refers to “those processes by which people seek plausibly to understand ambiguous, equivocal or confusing issues or events.” Although sensemaking has traditionally been understood as retrospective in nature (Weick, 1995), a strand of more recent theorizing points to its prospective dimensions, the capacity to generate forward-oriented interpretations under conditions of uncertainty (Brown, Colville & Pye, 2015, p. 268). It is this prospective dimension that is most directly relevant to the sensemaking interface function this paper proposes. Critically, sensemaking is not the interpretation of a pre-existing reality. It is the active construction of a workable understanding that enables coordinated action under conditions of equivocality. Three properties of sensemaking are directly relevant to the argument developed in this paper. First, sensemaking is continuous rather than episodic. It does not occur at defined moments but operates as an ongoing organizational process. Second, sensemaking is enacted. Organizations do not merely observe their environments but actively shape what they attend to through the actions they take. Third, sensemaking is inherently connected to decision-making: how organizations make sense of emerging signals directly determines what strategic choices become visible and actionable. Although sensemaking has traditionally been understood as retrospective in nature, a strand of more recent theorizing points to its prospective dimensions - the capacity to generate forward-oriented

interpretations under conditions of uncertainty (Brown, Colville & Pye, 2015, p. 268). It is this prospective dimension that is most directly relevant to the sensemaking interface function this paper proposes.
Sensemaking is selected as the primary theoretical lens because, unlike dynamic capabilities, which address organizational capacity for change, or ambidexterity, which addresses structural design, sensemaking directly theorizes the interpretive process through which equivocal signals are translated into actionable organizational understanding.
This paper draws additionally on Teece's (2007) dynamic capabilities framework, specifically its sensing component. Teece identifies sensing, the organizational capacity to detect, monitor, and interpret signals from the environment before they crystallize into obvious opportunities or threats, as the first and foundational component of dynamic capability. Organizations that lack this capacity do not merely respond slowly; they respond to conditions that have already changed. In BANI environments, where disruptions are systemic and interdependent, sensing cannot be the exclusive province of top management or strategic planning functions. It must be embedded in organizational units that operate at the interface between the organization's strategic intent and the market and technological signals that continuously redefine what is strategically relevant. This paper argues that corporate innovation teams, repositioned as sensemaking interfaces, constitute precisely this capacity.

3. METHODOLOGY

This paper employs a practice-informed conceptual methodology grounded in systematic engagement with a six-year corpus of documented practitioner discourse. The conceptual argument integrates insights from strategic management, innovation management, and complexity theory, developed through sustained interpretive analysis of how corporate innovation practitioners have framed their work under conditions of increasing environmental uncertainty.
The primary empirical basis consists of a systematic reading of The Innovator's Handbook series (2021–2025) and its 2026 successor, Growth Guide: Innovation Impact in 2026, published by the Innov8rs community. These publications synthesize insights from over 80 practitioner sessions annually, involving corporate innovation leaders across industries, organizational sizes, and geographies. Each edition was read in full, with sustained interpretive attention directed at how practitioners describe the relationship between innovation activity and strategic decision-making, the structural tensions between innovation teams and their organizational contexts, and how these descriptions have shifted in response to changing environmental conditions.
The practitioner corpus is not treated as a source of theoretical authority but as documented evidence of how corporate innovation practitioners frame organizational challenges.
The analysis is inductive and interpretive rather than hypothesis-driven. Rather than applying a pre-defined coding scheme, the reading process was oriented by a sensitizing question: how do corporate innovation practitioners frame the role of innovation teams in relation to strategic decisions, and how has that framing changed as environmental uncertainty has increased? Patterns were identified through recurrence across independent practitioner voices, industries, and publication years, rather than through frequency counts or formal content analysis.
The observable evolution of the publication format, from the knowledge-oriented Innovator's Handbook to the impact-oriented Growth Guide in 2026, is treated as a contextual signal consistent with the environmental shift the paper theorizes, rather than as mere editorial rebranding.
The author contributed a practitioner perspective to the 2026 edition of the corpus, published within the Growth Guide: Innovation Impact in 2026. This dual position — as both analyst of the corpus and practitioner-contributor within it - is acknowledged as a source of reflexivity. The author's contribution is treated as one practitioner voice among several within the corpus, not as the primary empirical basis for the paper's claims.
This approach follows the tradition of practice-informed theory development, in which theoretical propositions are developed through sustained engagement with organizational phenomena rather than through formal empirical testing (Van de Ven, 2007; Schön, 1983). The contribution of the paper is conceptual: it develops propositions about the evolving role of corporate innovation teams in strategic decision-making under conditions of persistent uncertainty, grounded in observed practitioner patterns and positioned for future empirical validation.

4. THE MECHANISM SHIFT: FROM HANDOVER TO SENSEMAKING INTERFACE

In organizationally stable environments, the mechanism connecting innovation activity to strategic decision-making followed a recognizable logic. Innovation teams operated upstream of strategy: they explored opportunity spaces, developed and tested concepts, and reduced uncertainty to a level at which outputs could be transferred into the organization's operational and strategic systems. Strategy received validated concepts and determined how to scale or deploy them. Operations received implementation-ready solutions. The sequence of explore, validate, and hand over was coherent because the system receiving innovation outputs remained sufficiently stable to be anticipated. Uncertainty was a temporary condition that innovation was expected to resolve before the handover occurred.
Global instability disrupts this mechanism at its foundational assumption. In BANI environments, the receiving system - the organizational and market context into which innovation outputs are delivered - does not remain stable while innovation work proceeds. It is itself subject to continuous disruption. As Cascio (2020) observes, BANI conditions are

characterized not by isolated uncertainties but by systemic, interdependent disruptions that make the environment incomprehensible through conventional analytical tools. The consequence for innovation practice is direct: there is no stable system to hand over to. Innovation cannot resolve uncertainty before the handover because the uncertainty does not reside only in the innovation project. It resides in the environment that will receive whatever the project produces. Under these conditions, validated answers become a temporary artifact, not a durable output. What innovation generates is not certainty but better-informed options, and those options enter a context that continues to evolve after they are generated. The mechanism shifts from sequential to continuous, and from handover to ongoing interface.
Table 1 summarizes this shift across five dimensions.

Table 1: Innovation team function: Traditional model versus BANI-adapted model

Dimension	Traditional Model	BANI-Adapted Model
Primary function of the innovation team	Solution generation	Signal interpretation
Relationship to uncertainty	Reduce before handover	Navigate continuously
Output of the innovation process	Validated answers	Informed options
Connection to strategy	Sequential - innovation precedes strategy	Continuous - innovation informs strategy in real time
Critical organizational capability	Validation accuracy	Interpretive coherence

Source: Author's own elaboration.

This shift in mechanism requires a corresponding shift in how we conceptualize the organizational role of innovation teams. This paper proposes the concept of the sensemaking interface to describe that role. A sensemaking interface is an organizational unit whose primary function is not to reduce uncertainty to the point of resolution, but to continuously translate emerging signals from markets, technology, competitive dynamics, and internal organizational learning into strategic choices under conditions of persistent uncertainty. The concept draws on sensemaking theory (Brown, Colville & Pye, 2015) in its emphasis on the active, ongoing construction of workable understanding, and on Teece's (2007) sensing component of dynamic capabilities in its positioning of this function as a source of strategic advantage. What distinguishes the sensemaking interface from related organizational concepts is its explicitly relational character: it does not operate as a separate unit that periodically delivers results, but as a continuous connective tissue between strategic intent and operational reality.
This positioning distinguishes the sensemaking interface from three related but distinct organizational concepts. It is not an innovation hub, as a dedicated space for idea generation that operates in deliberate isolation from the core business. Unlike the 'pirates in the navy' dynamic described by Viki, Toma, and Gons (2017), in which innovation teams operate in deliberate tension with the core organization, the sensemaking interface is defined by its connective rather than its separatist function. And it is not an R&D function, as a technically specialized unit whose outputs feed into a defined product development pipeline. The sensemaking interface is defined not by its structural position but by its functional orientation: it faces simultaneously toward the organization's strategic direction and toward the conditions that continuously redefine what that direction means in practice. Its value lies not in what it produces but in what it enables: the organization's capacity to remain coherently oriented under conditions that would otherwise produce strategic paralysis or incoherent action. Emergent organizational responses to this challenge are already visible in practice: companies such as Royal Philips have established cross-functional portfolio teams whose explicit mandate is to manage initiatives that fall outside both R&D and business unit structures, operating, in effect, as strategic interfaces between innovation activity and organizational direction (de Man, Plotnikova, & Hoeksema, 2025).

5. DIGITAL TOOLS AND AI: EXPANDING OPTIONS, INCREASING INTERPRETIVE DEMANDS

The emergence of digital experimentation tools, low-code and vibe coding platforms, and artificial intelligence has fundamentally altered the economics of innovation. What previously required months of development time and significant resource commitment can now be tested within days at a fraction of the cost. This reduction in the cost and speed of experimentation has expanded the range of options that innovation teams can explore and has lowered the threshold for initiating new initiatives. In this sense, AI and digital tools represent a genuine amplification of organizational exploratory capacity.
The strategic implications of this amplification, however, are more complex than they first appear. As experimentation becomes cheaper and faster, organizations do not simply become more innovative. They become capable of generating more options than they can meaningfully process, evaluate, and integrate into strategic decisions. The challenge shifts from generating ideas to making sense of them. Speed of experimentation, without a corresponding capacity for interpretation and alignment, does not accelerate strategic learning. It accelerates the accumulation of unprocessed signals. Innovation teams risk producing more noise than insight, and organizations risk increasing the volume of decisions they face without improving the quality of the frameworks through which those decisions are made.
This second-order effect is particularly acute in BANI environments. Where the operating context is already characterized by non-linearity and incomprehensibility, the multiplication of experimental options compounds rather than resolves

interpretive complexity. The question facing organizations is no longer whether something can be tested quickly, but whether the organization possesses the interpretive capacity to determine what the test results mean for strategic direction. As Parker (2026) observes, there is no data about the future. The only data available about the future is data that organizations create through action. The value of AI-accelerated experimentation, therefore, depends entirely on whether organizations can convert the data generated into actionable knowledge rather than allowing it to accumulate as undifferentiated information.

This reframes the role of AI and digital tools in strategic decision-making. They are not decision-support systems in the conventional sense. They do not resolve decisions; they multiply the conditions under which decisions must be made. Their value is conditional: it depends on the presence of an organizational function capable of interpreting experimental outputs, filtering signal from noise, and translating learning into coherent strategic choices. This is precisely the function the sensemaking interface performs. Rather than asking what AI can do for innovation, the more productive question is what organizational capacity must exist for AI-generated options to become strategically useful. The answer, this paper argues, is the sustained interpretive work of innovation teams operating as sensemaking interfaces, teams whose primary contribution is not the generation of experiments but the organizational capacity to learn from them.

In this context, the concept of 'battles of assumptions' (Zhexembayeva, 2026) offers a practical illustration of how organizations can structure interpretive work under uncertainty. Rather than debating predicted ROI, which assumes the ability to forecast outcomes in an inherently unpredictable environment, organizations can reorient strategic conversations around the assumptions that drive those outcomes, testing which assumptions hold and which require revision. This approach transforms AI-accelerated experimentation from a source of complexity into a mechanism for disciplined strategic learning, but only when embedded within the governance and interpretive frameworks that give experimental outputs strategic meaning.

6. IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING

The repositioning of corporate innovation teams as sensemaking interfaces carries concrete implications for how organizations approach strategic decision-making under conditions of persistent uncertainty. These implications operate at three levels: the cognitive orientation of decision-makers, the design of organizational processes, and the metrics through which strategic effectiveness is assessed. Taken together, they suggest that strategic coherence in BANI environments is not achieved through more rigorous planning but through the deliberate cultivation of interpretive capacity at the interface between innovation activity and strategic intent.

From validation to interpretation. The dominant assumption in traditional innovation-strategy linkage is that innovation teams produce validated outputs: concepts, prototypes, or business cases that have been tested against sufficient evidence to warrant strategic commitment. In BANI environments, this assumption creates a structural delay: organizations wait for certainty that the environment will not provide. The implication is a reorientation of the innovation-strategy relationship away from the question 'is this validated?' toward the question 'what does this tell us about where we are and where we might go?' This shift does not eliminate the need for evidence. It changes the function of evidence from confirmation to orientation. Innovation teams operating as sensemaking interfaces do not deliver answers; they deliver informed perspectives on an evolving situation, and the strategic value of those perspectives depends on how quickly and coherently the organization can act on them. As Parker (2026) argues, the only data available about the future is data that organizations create through action, which means the interpretive work that follows experimentation is as strategically significant as the experimentation itself.

From planning to alignment. If interpretive capacity replaces predictive accuracy as the critical strategic capability, the organizational processes that support strategy must change accordingly. The implication is a shift from planning cycles that assume sufficient environmental stability to project forward toward alignment mechanisms that enable coherent action under conditions of ongoing uncertainty. This does not mean the abandonment of strategic direction; it means that strategic direction must be held loosely enough to be revised as interpretation evolves, while remaining clear enough to orient organizational action. Snowden and Boone's (2007) Cynefin framework provides a useful decision-making anchor here: in complex domains, where cause and effect can only be understood retrospectively, the appropriate organizational response is to probe, sense, and respond - to act in ways that generate information, interpret what that information reveals, and adjust direction accordingly. The sensemaking interface function is precisely this probe-sense-respond cycle, institutionalized within the organization's innovation structure. This transition is observable in practice. At Mars, the shift from project-level ROI debates toward 'battles of assumptions', validating the inputs that drive outcomes rather than predicting financial results, and this was embedded across all executive objective-setting, not only within the innovation function (Zhexembayeva, 2026). The result was a form of strategic alignment that could absorb uncertainty rather than resist it.

From measuring output to measuring coherence. The third implication concerns how organizations assess the contribution of innovation teams to strategic effectiveness. Traditional metrics: number of concepts developed, speed to prototype, percentage of projects reaching market, measure the productivity of the innovation process without capturing its strategic value. If the primary function of innovation teams in BANI environments is interpretive rather than generative, the relevant question is not how many options were produced but whether the organization's understanding of its strategic situation improved as a result of innovation activity. Coherence, as the degree to which organizational decisions remain oriented toward strategic intent, even as conditions change, becomes the appropriate unit of assessment.

This requires a different kind of governance: not stage-gate reviews that evaluate whether projects meet predefined criteria, but ongoing strategic conversations that assess whether the organization is learning from its experimentation and adjusting its direction accordingly (Viki, Toma & Gons, 2017). The innovation mandate, in this framing, is not to deliver solutions but to sustain the organization's capacity for strategic orientation under uncertainty.

These three shifts are mutually reinforcing. Reorienting from validation to interpretation creates the need for alignment mechanisms rather than planning cycles. Shifting from planning to alignment requires new metrics that capture coherence rather than output. And measuring coherence rather than output creates the organizational permission for innovation teams to function as genuine sensemaking interfaces rather than solution delivery units operating under borrowed legitimacy. Together, they constitute a practical framework for organizations seeking to maintain strategic effectiveness in conditions that the conventional innovation-strategy relationship was not designed to handle.

7. CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that global instability, characterized by BANI conditions, fundamentally alters the mechanism through which corporate innovation teams contribute to strategic decision-making. The traditional model breaks down when the receiving system is itself in continuous flux. Under these conditions, innovation teams are not primarily solution generators; they are sensemaking interfaces whose strategic value lies in their capacity to translate emerging signals into informed options that organizations can act on without waiting for certainty that the environment will not provide. Strategic effectiveness, in this framing, depends less on the accuracy of planning and more on the quality of the interpretive loop connecting experimentation, organizational learning, and strategic alignment.

The paper carries two limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the argument is conceptual rather than empirical. The propositions developed here are grounded in systematic engagement with practitioner discourse and informed by established theoretical frameworks, but they have not been tested against organizational data. Empirical research, examining how innovation teams in specific organizational contexts actually perform the sensemaking interface function, and with what strategic outcomes, is needed to validate, refine, or challenge the framework proposed. Second, the practitioner corpus on which the analysis draws reflects primarily Western European and North American corporate innovation contexts. The degree to which the sensemaking interface concept travels across different institutional environments, organizational cultures, and market conditions remains an open question that cross-contextual research could productively address.

These limitations point toward a research agenda. Future work might examine the organizational conditions under which sensemaking interfaces are most effectively institutionalized, the governance structures that support rather than constrain their interpretive function, and the specific competencies that enable innovation teams to perform signal translation at the strategy-operations interface. Particular attention might be directed toward emerging economy contexts, where corporate innovation functions are often less institutionalized, and the gap between strategic intent and operational capacity may be more pronounced, amplifying both the challenges and the potential value of the sensemaking interface function. The growing availability of AI-generated experimental data makes this agenda increasingly urgent: as the volume of options organizations must evaluate continues to expand, the capacity to interpret rather than merely generate becomes the decisive strategic capability.

REFERENCES

Bennett, N., & Lemoine, G. J. (2014). What VUCA really means for you. *Harvard Business Review, 92*(1/2), 27.

Brown, A. D., Colville, I., & Pye, A. (2015). Making sense of sensemaking in organization studies. *Organization Studies, 36*(2), 265–277.

Cascio, J. (2020). Facing the age of chaos. Retrieved from https://medium.com/@cascio/facing-the-age-of-chaos-b00687b1f51d

Cooper, R. G. (2008). Perspective: The Stage-Gate idea-to-launch process — Update, what's new, and NexGen systems. *Journal of Product Innovation Management, 25*(3), 213–232.

de Man, A.-P., Plotnikova, A., & Hoeksema, L. (2025). Keeping innovative projects aligned with strategy. In *The innovator's handbook 2025.* Innov8rs. Retrieved from https://innov8rs.co

Innov8rs. (2021). *The innovator's handbook 2021.* Retrieved from https://innov8rs.co

Innov8rs. (2022). *The innovator's handbook 2022.* Retrieved from https://innov8rs.co

Innov8rs. (2023). *The innovator's handbook 2023.* Retrieved from https://innov8rs.co

Innov8rs. (2024). *The innovator's handbook 2024.* Retrieved from https://innov8rs.co

Innov8rs. (2025). *The innovator's handbook 2025.* Retrieved from https://innov8rs.co

Innov8rs. (2026). *Growth guide: Innovation impact in 2026.* Retrieved from https://the-compass.io/gg-impact2026

Nešić, S. (2026). What corporate innovation teams need to do to succeed in 2026. In *Growth guide: Innovation impact in 2026.* Innov8rs. Retrieved from https://the-compass.io/p/how-to-gain-and-keep-leadership-support-and-strategic-alignment

Parker, E. (2026). Playing to win vs. playing to learn. In *Growth guide: Innovation impact in 2026.* Innov8rs. Retrieved from https://the-compass.io/p/playing-to-win-vs-playing-to-learn

Schön, D. A. (1983). *The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action.* New York: Basic Books.

Snowden, D. J., & Boone, M. E. (2007). A leader's framework for decision making. *Harvard Business Review, 85*(11), 68–76.

Teece, D. J. (2007). Explicating dynamic capabilities: The nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance. *Strategic Management Journal, 28*(13), 1319–1350.

Van de Ven, A. H. (2007). *Engaged scholarship: A guide for organizational and social research.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Viki, T., Toma, D., & Gons, E. (2017). *The corporate startup: How established companies can develop successful innovation ecosystems.* Norderstedt: Books on Demand.

Zhexembayeva, N. (2026). Reinventing the innovation function for the realities of 2026. In *Growth guide: Innovation impact in 2026.* Innov8rs. Retrieved from https://the-compass.io/p/reinventing-the-innovation-function-for-the-realities-of-2026